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Abstract
We consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses Ram-
sey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment, private
information, and political economy frictions. We identify a su¢ cient condition to rule
out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum: If there exists an admissible
allocation that converges to the rst best steady state, then all intertemporal distortions
are temporary in the second best. We analyze a series of applications to illustrate the
signicance of this result.
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1 Introduction
Perhaps the key lesson in public nance is that distortions should be spread across all margins.
Yet, many scal policy problems prescribe that distortions on the intertemporal margin ought
to be purely temporary, even as other distortions persist. The Ramsey taxation model is the
best known example: Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) rst established that optimal capital
income taxes are zero in the steady state, so that all intertemporal distortions eventually
vanish. This nding has been conrmed for a variety of more general environments.1 By
contrast, permanent intertemporal distortions typically arise in private information economies,
as the recent work on dynamic optimal taxation has emphasized.2
Why do some policy problems unequivocally rule out permanent intertemporal distortions?
What is di¤erent about economies where they are optimal? We propose a unied framework
to explore these questions for a very broad class of public nance problems for innite-horizon
economies. The class of environments we consider encompasses and generalizes many well
known models. We capture policy problems with arbitrary scal instruments and environ-
ments with primitive constraints on optimal allocations. These include variants of the Ramsey
model with aggregate or idiosyncratic risk, as well as economies with incentive compatibility
constraints due to limited commitment, political economy frictions, or private information.
We also capture settings which combine these constraints with arbitrary asset restrictions such
as incomplete markets and borrowing constraints on the government or private agents. This
class of problems can be represented as a choice of allocations subject to resource feasibility
and a set of additional constraints.3 We will refer to the corresponding solution as the second
best allocation. The choice of allocations subject only to resource feasibility constraints will
correspond to our notion of the rst best.
Our main contribution is to identify a su¢ cient condition that rules out permanent in-
tertemporal distortions at the optimum: If there exists an allocation that satises all constraints
and eventually converges to the rst best steady state, then all intertemporal distortions are
temporary in the second best. This condition is typically straightforward to verify since there
is no need to solve for the second best plan. For example, in a Ramsey model our su¢ cient
condition is satised as long as the government can save enough to nance all its expenditures
from asset returns. This makes it possible to eventually eliminate distortionary taxes and
converge to the rst best steady state.
Why does this condition rule permanent intertemporal distortions out? Suppose a candi-
date optimum at the limiting stationary allocation exhibits an intertemporal wedge. Clearly
a reallocation of resources over time would generate rst order welfare gains. If our su¢ cient
1Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) generalize this result for a broad class of deterministic economies. Zhu
(1992) and Farhi (2006) show that it also holds with aggregate uncertainty for complete and incomplete markets,
respectively.
2Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson (1985) rst show that intertemporal distortions arise in dy-
namic disability insurance and moral hazard models. Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) show that
interteporal distortions prevail in a large class of private information economies.
3This formulation follows in the tradition of the primal approach to optimal taxation, pioneered in Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
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condition holds, it is possible to eventually relax all the constraints on optimal policies 
this is exactly what converging to the rst best amounts to. Then, it is possible to design an
intertemporal reallocation of resources that improves on the candidate optimum by redistrib-
uting intratemporal distortions over time without violating any future constraints. Hence, the
second best allocation cannot have permanent intertemporal distortions.4
Our result provides immediate insight into many policy problems. For example, consider
the class of economies where a benevolent government is subject to a limited commitment
constraint. In these economies, the continuation value of the second best allocation must exceed
the value of an outside option at every date and state. The outside option typically consists
of a benecial temporary deviation followed by a punishment phase5. Since by denition the
rst best improves on any feasible continuation, it must also improve on the outside option.
Hence, limited commitment constraints satisfy our su¢ cient condition and they cannot alone
lead to permanent intertemporal distortions.
We also contribute to the understanding of second best problems that do exhibit permanent
intertemporal distortions. Economies with private information are one such example. The
second best allocation generally displays a positive intertemporal wedge in these economies,
as shown in Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003). Albanesi and Sleet (2006) and
Kocherlakota (2005) characterize the corresponding properties of optimal income taxes. Under
private information, our condition is not satised, since the rst best continuation allocations
are typically not incentive compatible: the distortions arising from private information cannot
be front-loaded. Hence, the presence of intertemporal distortions is a fundamental feature of
this class of economies.
Our result can provide guidance on how to pose normative questions in scal policy. The
recent research on optimal taxation with private information has emphasized the shortcomings
of an approach based on arbitrary scal instruments. The advantage of constraints derived
from primitives is that relevant trade-o¤s are not unknowingly left out, leading to greater
condence in the resulting policy prescriptions.6 For example, the Ramsey model rules out
lump sum taxes and prescribes a zero capital tax in the steady state. By contrast, second best
allocations under private information generally feature permanent intertemporal distortions.
The literature on private information, however, does not isolate the relevant trade-o¤ missing
in the Ramsey model. Our result makes it clear that the ability to front-load all distortions
in the Ramsey model generates this fundamental di¤erence. This nding provides a deeper
understanding of both approaches.7
We also propose a weaker version of our su¢ cient condition which applies only to a sub-
set of public policy problems, namely those in which the path of aggregate variables is not
constrained by the evolution of private agentshistories. In this case, in order to rule out per-
manent intertemporal distortions in the second best, it is su¢ cient to nd an allocation that
4The absence of permanent intertemporal distortions does not necessarily imply that capital income taxes
are zero as often more than one scal system can implement the second best allocation.
5"Best sustainable equilibria," rst introduced by Chari and Kehoe (1990), are perhaps the best known
example of this class of second best problems.
6See Werning (2007) for an extensive discussion on this point.
7Albanesi and Armenter (2007) provide an extended discussion of optimal capital taxation in Ramsey models.
3
satises all constraints and attains the rst best level of aggregate capital. When this weaker
condition is satised in economies with idiosyncratic risk and incomplete insurance, there will
be no intertemporal distortions even if the rst best continuation is not attainable. Two no-
table examples are Aiyagaris (1995) optimal taxation problem with borrowing constraints
and a version of the political economy model in Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007).
The standard Ramsey model under a balanced-budget constraint also generally satises this
condition.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formally characterizes our class of second best
problems. Allocations must satisfy feasibility and a set of additional restrictions, which we refer
to as admissibility constraints. In order to encompass a large class of problems, our formulation
for the admissibility constraints is general and abstract. One or more constraints can be present
at each node of the economy and they may involve a forward-looking component. They can
depend on the physical state of the economy and must be time separable. We also introduce a
set of auxiliary variables to capture exogenous restrictions on the asset space or the evolution
of costates implied by the admissibility constraints. This allows us to capture most second best
problems that admit a primal representation. While working with a general framework, we
need to impose a set of regularity conditions. These rule out some economies with di¤erences
in preferences between the government and private agents,8 as well as economies with non-
convexities. Section 3 illustrates how three well-known policy problems can be easily captured
within our general formulation.
The proof of our result is presented in Section 4 and can be outlined as follows. We
split the second best problem into two stages. The rst stage takes as given the path for
the auxiliary variables and solves for the optimal allocations subject to feasibility and the
admissibility constraints. We show that if eventually no future admissibility constraint is
binding in the stage one problem, then the optimal allocations will not feature permanent
intertemporal distortions. The proof of this result is closely related to Zhu (1992): once all
binding admissibility constraints are in the past, the structure of the rst order necessary
conditions for optimality is the same as in a Ramsey model with complete markets. However,
the forward-looking nature of the admissibility constraints implies that the optimal allocations
will usually not converge to the rst best.
The second stage consists of choosing the optimal path for the auxiliary variables. Our
su¢ cient condition for zero intertemporal distortions comes into play here: if there is an
admissible allocation that attains the rst best steady state, there must be a corresponding
path for the auxiliary variables that eventually fully relaxes all admissibility constraints. We
then prove that the solution prescribes a path for the auxiliary variables such that all future
admissibility constraints eventually stop binding. Our result follows.
Section 5 illustrates several applications that illustrate the signicance of our result. Section
6 discusses a weaker version of our su¢ cient condition that applies only to a subset of second
best problems in our general class. Section 7 concludes.
8Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2007) and Yared (2007) analyze political economy models that allow for
di¤erential discounting. We can capture these models in the case in which the government and private agents
have the same discount factor.
4
2 The Model
The economy is characterized by a nite set of exogenous states st 2 S, governed by a Markov
probability process  (stjst 1). Let st = fs0; s1; :::; stg be the history of realizations of the
exogenous state and St the corresponding support. We use Sdjst to denote the set of date d
histories that are continuation of st, i.e., Sdjst = sd 2 Sdjst  sd; d  0	.









denote consumption and leisure of a household of type i 2 I at date t













































: st 2 St; t  0	.


















: st 2 St; t  0	 the corresponding plan. The initial distribution of capital k0 is



























gt (st) : s
t 2 St; t  0	 is an exogenously given plan for government consumption.
We assume that g does not generate utility nor enter the production function.
Denition 1 An allocation fx; kg is feasible if for all st 2 St; t  0 it satises the resource













for all i 2 I.








respectively. Both X and K can be taken to be convex and compact. Let X and K denote the
set of plans x and k in X and K respectively.

























The above formulation allows us to encompass an arbitrary utilitarian social welfare function
as well as settings with ex-post heterogeneity.9
With the physical environment given by feasibility and payo¤s by (2) we are set to dene
the rst best or unconstrained optimum.




is rst best if U
 
xfb; s0
  U (x; s0) for any
feasible allocation fx; kg.
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Interesting policy problems typically involve additional constraints on the choice of alloca-
tions beyond feasibility. For example, the set of scal instruments may be limited or private
information may give rise to incentive compatibility constraints. Also, the space of assets
that private agents or the government can trade may be restricted. We refer to this class of
restrictions as admissibility constraints. The second best problem consists of nding feasible
allocations that maximize a social objective function subject to the admissibility constraints.
We introduce a general formulation for the admissibility constraints that makes it pos-






  A : st 2 St; t  0	 where A is a convex and compact subset of <m. This vari-
able allows us to capture arbitrary constraints on the asset space as well as restrictions on the
evolution of costates that endogenously arise within the problem. The admissibility constraints












 2    at  st ; st ; (4)
for all st 2 St; t  0, and
a0 (s0) 2 A0:
Here H is a twice di¤erentiable, bounded function unto <m,    at  st ; st is a correspondence
unto <m, and A0 is a subset of <m.
We can now formally dene the notion of admissible allocations and second best.
9We have excluded economies with history dependence in preferences for simplicity. The environment can
be extended to some non time-separable preferences, such as habit formation or Kreps-Portheus utility.
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Denition 4 A feasible allocation fx; kg is admissible if there exists a plan for the auxiliary
variable a such that
1. The allocation fx; kg satises (3) for all st 2 St; t  0,
2. The auxiliary variable a satises (4) for all st+1 2 St+1, t  0, and a0 (s0) 2 A0.





any admissible allocation fx; kg.
The class of second best problems we consider is restricted by two dening properties of
the admissibility constraints. These properties are stated in terms of functions fH;  g.
First, the admissibility constraints must display a limited degree of history dependence.
Formally, allocations from nodes arbitrarily far in the past or outside the set of continuation
histories do not a¤ect the admissibility constraints. So, while we allow a nite number of past
or non-continuation allocations to be restricted, the admissibility constraint must be eventually
forward-looking. In addition, admissibility constraints must be time-separable with the same
intertemporal discount rate as in (2), again after a nite number of periods.
Condition 6 (Limited History Dependence) There exists a nite d  0 such that for any
admissible allocation fx; kg, any node sj, and any date t  j+ d, each admissibility constraint
n  m satises:








































for some functions rn and hn:
Condition 6 restricts the class of problems to which we can apply our results. For example,
some second best problems impose unlimited history dependence. A trivial case is a Ramsey
model in which taxes are restricted to be constant. The decision at the initial date constraints
allocations arbitrarily far in the future and the problem does not satisfy (5). Limited commit-
ment constraints under heterogeneous discount rates or non-time separable preferences often
fail to satisfy time separability in the form of (6). Condition 6 does not, however, restrict the
second best plan to exhibit limited history dependence.
The second dening restriction on the class of admissibility constraints concerns the law of
motion of the auxiliary variable, leading to conditions on the correspondence  .
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The class of second best problem dened by conditions 6 and 7 is very broad. It includes
well known public nance problems with and without permanent intertemporal distortions, as
well as interesting new environments stemming from combinations of the typical constraints.
In Section 3, we illustrate how several benchmark second best problems can be adapted to our
formulation.
2.1 Regularity Conditions
We now impose a number of regularity conditions on the problem in order to guarantee
tractability. These conditions allow us to use Lagrangian methods to characterize optimal
allocation and are standard in the literature.
We begin by stating a set of conditions on primitives.
Condition 8 Functions fU;Fg are bounded, twice continuously di¤erentiable with bounded
rst-order derivatives in X and K. Moreover,
1. U is strictly increasing in consumption and leisure, and strictly concave.
2. F is strictly increasing in labor and capital, homogeneous of degree 1, and concave.
We state the remaining regularity conditions as properties of the second best allocation.
Ideally we would like to express these conditions in terms of the primitives of the problem. The
generality of our environment, though, makes this a very cumbersome task. These regularity
conditions can be restated in terms of primitives for each specic applications.
First, we impose two conditions that enable us to apply Lagrangian methods. The rst is
an interiority restriction.
Condition 9 There exist a second best allocation fx; kg such that for all nodes st 2 St,
t  0, it lies in the interior of X K:
The second is a non-degenerate constraint qualication.
Condition 10 For a second best allocation fx; kg, if f1; 2; :::; ~mg admissibility constraints










has full rank, where ~H is given by the f1; 2; :::; ~mg constraints.
Next, we impose a condition that guarantees the admissibility constraints are well-behaved.
Condition 11 There exists a second best allocation fx; kg such that for any node st 2 St; t 















  Hn xfb; kfbj  sj 1 ; sj ;
then admissibility constraint n is not binding at sj 2 Sj jst, j  t.
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This condition imposes that, if the value of a given admissibility constraint reaches past
the rst best, then the constraint will not be binding. Jointly with our other regularity con-
ditions, it ensures that rst order necessary conditions are su¢ cient. Given that we allow the
admissibility constraints to be non-convex, this restriction is quite weak and rules out only
very special cases.
Finally, we require that the second best allocations approach a stationary limiting prob-
ability distribution, P1x . The limiting distribution need not be unique and, indeed, many
policy problems in our class feature more than one stationary distribution. We let P1x =
fP1x1 ; P1x2 ; :::g denote the collection of stationary distributions for plan x.
Condition 12 A second best allocation fx; kg converges to a stationary distribution with
probability one.
Appendix A.1 provides a formal denition of the stationary probability distribution P1x ,
as well as a more formal restatement of Condition 12.
Condition 12 jointly with the regularity conditions on the primitives of our second best
problems ensure that the Lagrangian multipliers on the resource constraint and on the admis-
sibility constraints also converge to a stationary distribution with probability one.
3 Examples
This section illustrates how three benchmark optimal policy problems t into the general
formulation of the second best problem developed above.
3.1 Simple Ramsey Model
We rst consider a dynamic version of the Ramsey (1927) model of optimal taxation. Chari
and Kehoe (2001) review the macroeconomic applications of this paradigm. Here, we describe
the simplest version with a representative agent and no uncertainty.
The government chooses taxes to nance an exogenously given sequence of government
consumption. The main assumption is that lump sum taxes are not available. The government
can set proportional taxes on labor income  lt and on capital income 
k
t in each period. It can
also make non-negative transfers Tt and issue bonds, bt+1; paying o¤ one unit of consumption
at time t+ 1 and traded at price qt. The governments ow budget constraint is:
 ltwtlt + 
k
t rtkt + qtbt+1  bt + gt + Tt;
where wt and rt denote the rental rate of labor and capital, respectively. Iterating leads to the





 ltwtlt + 
k
t rtkt   gt   Tt

 b0; (7)
where q0t denotes the price of date t consumption and b0 is the initial stock of debt, which is
taken as given.
9









; prices fwt; rt; qtg1t=0
and an allocation fct; lt; kt; gtg1t=0 ; such that the allocation is optimal for the households and
the rms given the policies and prices, all markets clear, and the government budget constraint
(7) and the resource constraint (1) are satised. A Ramsey equilibrium for this economy is
simply the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the representative agents welfare from the
standpoint of time 0:
The rst step in the analysis consists in restating the problem in its primal form, that is as
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This inequality is known as implementability constraint and it captures all the restrictions
on the governments choice of allocations in addition to feasibility for this model and hence
denes the set of admissible allocations. The forward looking nature of this constraint reects
the governments ability to allocate taxes over time by borrowing or saving.
To express the implementability constraint in terms of our general formulation, set:





















The variable a0 represents the initial value of assets. Typically, its value is exogenously re-
stricted to exclude a solution in which the government sets k0 high enough to pay all out-
standing debt and raise enough assets so that that no distortionary taxes need to be imposed
in all future periods. A constraint on the initial value of k0 can be translated into an initial
condition for a0: For this problem, there are no admissibility constraints at any future date
and thus no auxiliary variables are needed.10 The resulting formulation of the second best
problem satises Condition 6 restricting the history dependence of admissibility constraints.
10 Incomplete factor taxation models, like Correia (1996) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997), assume there
is an additional factor of production that cannot be taxed. These models cannot be formulated with an
implementability constraint of the type above if we just x the capital tax at date t = 0. However, if we
prevent the government from any manipulation of the present value of assets at date t = 0, we then recover an
implementability constraint of the form above. The formulation at date t = 0 has implications for the long-run
capital tax. See Armenter (2007) for a discussion.
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3.2 Optimal Policies with Limited Commitment
The Ramsey model assumes that the policy is chosen once and for all in the initial period. This
requires a commitment technology to guarantee that the government will not revise policies at
a future date. This is a very strong assumption and several frameworks have been developed
to study optimal policies when a commitment technology is not available.
Reis (2006) studies a variant with limited commitment. The physical environment and the
set of scal instruments are the same as in the simple Ramsey model described in section 3.1.
The choice of policies is modelled as a game where both the government and private agents
make sequential decisions in every period. In each period, both the government and private
agents can default on outstanding debt obligations. The government decides how much to
punish households who defaulted in the previous period, chooses taxes and transfers for the
current period and decides whether to default on outstanding debt. Households then choose
consumption, labor, capital and whether to default on debt. Finally, markets meet and clear.
In a sustainable equilibrium for this game,11 equilibrium bond repayment is supported by
the threat of reversion to the worst sustainable equilibrium, in which the government is forced
to run a balanced budget and applies conscatory tax rates on capital. The best sustainable
equilibrium is the one that maximizes the representative agentslifetime utility and corresponds
to our notion of second best plan.
The sustainability constraint requires the continuation value of the governments utility on
the equilibrium path to exceed the continuation value of the worst sustainable equilibrium.
This introduces an additional admissibility constraint in each period relative to the simple
Ramsey model. The value of default only depends on the level of capital at the time of













  V def  kt  st 1 ; st :
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to 0 at all
periods. The time separability of preferences and the fact that the outside option only depends
on the continuation allocation and the current state implies that Condition 6 is satised. In
section 5.2, we return to the class of policy problems with limited commitment constraints and
apply our result to derive a key property of the second best allocation.
3.3 Ramsey Model with Incomplete Markets
In the previous examples, the admissibility constraints are captured by the functional H in
(3). We now consider the role of the auxiliary variables, a; and the constraint on their law of
11See Chari and Kehoe (1990).
12Reis (2006) analyzes a version of the model with no uncertainty. Here, we allow for aggregate shocks,
captured by the variable st:
11
motion   in (4). Their primary purpose is to capture constraints stemming from market incom-
pleteness. To illustrate, we concentrate on the version of the Ramsey model with incomplete
markets and no capital analyzed by Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppala (2003).
The economy is similar to the simple Ramsey model. There are aggregate shocks but there
is no capital. Importantly, bond returns cannot be contingent on the state of the economy, so
that markets are incomplete. Formally, bond repayments at time t are not measurable with




















Assuming utility is quasi-linear in consumption, we can write the governments present

























denotes labor income tax revenues net of government consumption at node




  0: (9)




























  Vt  st+1  0; (11)





































































  a2  st :
12
Market incompleteness and the non-negativity of transfers (11) translate into constraints








in the rst stage problem: The fact that (8) must hold




























  a4  st  0:
As in the Ramsey problem with complete markets, time separability of preferences guaran-
tees that Condition 6 is satised. Moreover, since   is linear in a; Condition 7 also holds for this
problem. If additional constraints, such as borrowing constraints or asset limits are imposed
on the governments problem, these can be easily captured by augmenting the correspondence
 :
4 Main Result
Our main result is that if there exists an allocation that converges to the rst best steady
state, then there are no permanent intertemporal distortions in the second best. If the su¢ cient
condition is satised, all distortions can be front-loaded, that is, all admissibility constraints can
eventually be relaxed. This allows distortions and resources to be reallocated intertemporally
without tightening future constraints.
We start with a simple Lemma about rst best allocations which enables us to formally
state our condition.
Lemma 13 A rst best allocation xfb converges to a unique stationary distribution P1fb .
This property is a straightforward implication of our regularity conditions on preferences
and technology.
We now state the su¢ cient condition.
Condition 14 For any initial conditions fk 1; a0g 2 K  A, there exists an admissible allo-
cation fx; kg which converges to the rst best limiting distribution with probability one, i.e.,
lim
t!1Pr (xt 2 B) = P
1
fb (B)
for all measurable B  X.
13
The connection of Condition 14 with the ability to front-load all distortions is clear: an
admissible allocation which eventually attains the rst best has the property that all distortions
have indeed been front-loaded.
Condition 14 is very easy to verify, since it just requires nding one admissible allocation
that converges to the rst best limiting distribution. This allocation does not need to satisfy
any optimality conditions and can follow any arbitrary transition path provided it is admissible.
We do not need, thus, to solve for the second best plan to know whether Condition 14 holds.
We now proceed to state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 15 Let Condition 14 hold and fx; kg be a second best allocation. Then for any
P1 2 P1x and i 2 I either














































The formal statement of the result claries the sense in which there are no permanent
intertemporal distortions.13 First, the result holds for the stationary second best allocations.
The absence of permanent intertemporal distortions does not rule out signicant and prolonged
distortions on the transition path. Second, Theorem 15 allows for the optimal allocations to
be distorted in the limit. For one, the intertemporal distortion could be uctuating around 0
instead of being identically 0, if case two prevails. The unconditional expectation may be quite
di¤erent from zero. Theorem 15 only asserts that the distortion cannot be strictly positive
with probability one or, for that matter, strictly negative. Finally, the absence of permanent
intertemporal distortions does not necessarily translate into a prescription for zero capital
income taxes. For example, Kocherlakota (2005) presents a private information economy with
13 Intertemporal distortions may be dened in any economy where private agents or the government face
dynamic choices, even if no physical technology for capital accumulation is available. In this case, one can dene
a social discount factor which equates the marginal utility of current consumption to the expected marginal



















permanent intertemporal distortions where the expected marginal tax on capital income is
zero. On the other hand, Aiyagari (1995) is an example of an economy with no permanent
intertemporal distortions where a positive capital tax is needed in the second best.
In general, the limiting second best allocation will display permanent intratemporal dis-
tortions. For example, the Ramsey equilibrium with complete markets does not feature any
intertemporal distortions but typically displays a positive labor income tax in the steady state
which translates into a permanent wedge on the intratemporal margin.
We prove Theorem 15 in several steps described in the remainder of this Section. We start
by splitting the second best problem into two stages. The rst stage solves for the allocations
given a path for the auxiliary variables. The second stage solves for the optimal path for the
auxiliary variables and hence characterizes the second best plan. We show in the rst stage
that if future admissibility constraints eventually do not bind, then there are no permanent
intertemporal distortions. This result corresponds to Proposition 18. In the second stage, we
show that if the su¢ cient condition holds, then the optimal path for the auxiliary variables
has the property that future admissibility constraint eventually will not bind.
We now provide a formal statement of the two stages that comprise the second best problem.
Let A be the set of auxiliary variable plans in A.
Denition 16 Let W (a) : A ! < be given by
W (a) = max
fx;kg
U (x; s0) (Problem 1)
subject to (1) and (3) for all st 2 St, t  0:
The existence of a bounded function W (a) is granted by Condition 8 and X K being a
compact space.
The second stage problem then consists in choosing the auxiliary variables to maximize
W (a).
Proposition 17 Let a solve
sup
a2A
W (a) (Problem 2)
subject to (4) for all st 2 St, t  0 and a0 (s0) 2 A0. Then an admissible allocation x is
second best if and only if W (a) = U (x; s0).
Proof. Straightforward
15
4.1 First Stage: Choosing Allocations
We study Problem 1 given plan a. Conditions 8 and 10 allow us to write the Lagrangian to
characterize W (a):





























































  0 and   st 2 <m+ are the Lagrangian multipliers, normalized by t  stjs0,
for the resource constraint (1) and the system of admissibility constraints (3) at each node st.















































































































are indexed by only two nodes but they may depend on
allocations evaluated at other nodes.

















































































The rst order conditions for this problem are necessary but, without further structure on the
choice set, they are generally not su¢ cient.
The rst important result is that, if future admissibility constraints stop binding, the allo-
cation that solves the rst stage problem will not feature permanent intertemporal distortions.










then for all i 2 I either
1. There is no intertemporal distortion with probability 1 in the limit and (15) holds;
or
2. The intertemporal distortion uctuates around 0 and (16) holds.
Proof. In the Appendix
The key to the proof is that when future admissibility constraints stop binding, only the
history of past binding constraints matters. Then, the system of equations that characterize the
optimal allocation from that node onwards has the same structure as in a Ramsey problem with








and a summary statistic for the history of binding constraints. The rest of the proof is similar
to Zhu (1992), who shows that in a Ramsey model with complete markets at the limiting
distribution the expected tax on capital income is zero. This corresponds to the absence of
permanent intertemporal distortions. In economies with a representative agent, the occurrence
of (15) or (16) solely depends on the properties of preferences. With heterogeneous agents,
additional factors, such as the presence of borrowing constraints, also play a role.15
Before we move to the second stage problem, we derive two important properties of the
value function W (a). The rst is weak quasi-concavity, which follows from the structure of
Problem 1 without further assumptions. The second property amounts to strict quasi-concavity
of W (a) in a neighborhood of the rst best plan.






: st 2 St; t  0	. Then the following is true:
1. If " is non-negative everywhere, then W (a+ ") W (a),





Proof. In the Appendix
14The limits on history dependence imposed by Condition 6 are important for this step. Without them, past
constraints could arbitrarily dictate the exact path of all future allocations and the result would not hold.
15See Section 6 for a discussion.
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4.2 Second Stage: Choosing the Auxiliary Variable
We now study Problem 2 the choice of the auxiliary variables a. Using the properties of
  and the su¢ cient condition 14, we show that the auxiliary variable plan a converges to a
subset of A where no admissibility constraints bind.
We start by characterizing the set of values for the auxiliary variables that can support a
























































  a kt  st 1 ; st can sustain the rst best allocations from
st 1 onwards. However, we also need the auxiliary plan a to be admissible itself, i.e., to satisfy
(4) at all nodes.








be the set of at
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  a kt  st 1 ; st  sj








, and a0 satises (4) for all sj 2 Sj jst, j  t.








are compact rectangles in A  recall A is compact itself.
Let Kfb denote the support of the capital allocation at the rst best stationary distribu-







	 2 KfbS, the setAfb kt  st 1 ; st
is not empty. We can then dene the subset in A that supports allocations at the rst best
limiting stationary distribution
Afb = [KfbSAfb [kt; st] :
There is little we can say about the set Afb as we allowed H to be non-convex.
The next Proposition states that if the second best path for the auxiliary variables a
reaches the set Afb, then no admissibility constraint is ever binding at all continuation nodes.
Proposition 22 Let a
 
st
 2 Afb: Then the admissibility constraints (3) are not binding at
any node sj 2 Sj jst; j  t:
Proof. In the Appendix
To prove Proposition 22 we make use of Condition 11. Without it we could not navigate
through the potentially complex set Afb. An alternative would be to impose enough structure
on the primitives such that Afb is convex and compact. The conditions needed would be
considerably more restrictive than Condition 11.
16A formal denition is available in the Appendix.
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There are only two steps left to nish the proof: to show that we can and we want to con-
verge to Afb. Proposition 23 establishes a key property of  , akin to monotonicity. Proposition
23 implies we can always nd an admissible plan for the auxiliary variables which converges
to Afb almost surely.
Proposition 23 Let 14 hold and at
 
st









+ (1  ) at+1
 
st+1
 2    at  st ; st : (20)
Proof. In the Appendix









and Afb. The convexity of  , as stated in Condition 7, would then imply








could be the starting point
of a path leading to Afb. This would contradict Condition 14.
The nal step in the argument is to show that the second best plan indeed converges to the
set Afb. We can use Proposition 23 to show that, if a candidate second best path for a does not
converge to the set Afb, it is possible to construct an alternative a0 such that a0t
 
st
  at  st
for all nodes st 2 St, t  0. Plan a0 weakly improves upon a by the quasi-concavity of value
function W (a)  established by Proposition 19.
Proposition 24 Let 14 hold and fx; kg be a second best allocation. Then there exists an







Proof. In the Appendix
All the pieces for the proof of Theorem 15 are now in place. For any second best allocation
plan, Proposition 24 implies that the auxiliary variables converge to the set Afb. By Proposition
22, eventually no future admissibility constraint is binding and the proof of Theorem 15 follows
from 18. The formal proof is in the Appendix.
5 Applications
We now describe how our result can be used in a series of applications.
5.1 Ramsey Models with Asset Constraints
Condition 14 in the simple Ramsey model with a representative agent is quite simple. It
amounts to the governments ability to accumulate enough assets such that it can nance
government consumption via the interest revenues. In a closed economy, this is possible only
if private agents can borrow so that the government can accumulate enough assets.
It is simple to characterize the level of government assets that supports the continuation
rst best. This level depends on the outstanding capital stock and can be calculated from the

























kt + bt where bt denotes outstanding government debt. Then, the level of







kt +bt (kt) = at (kt) :
Denote with bpt the debt issued by private agents. In equilibrium bonds market clear
bpt + bt = 0 at all dates: If a borrowing constraint b is imposed on private agents, b
p
t  b, it
gives rise to an additional constraint on the stage one problem that can be captured in the
correspondence  , specically,  bt  b in terms of government savings. If  bt (kt) > b the rst
best cannot be sustained at kt; since at (kt) will not be admissible.
While this example is very stylized it carries a general lesson. Savings constraints on the
government or borrowing constraints on private agents translate into additional admissibility
constraints which may prevent the government to accumulate enough assets to pay for gov-
ernment consumption out of interest revenues. If this is the case, then additional admissibility
constraint causes Condition 14 to fail and the optimal allocation may feature intertemporal
distortions.
This observation can be used to rationalize the properties of Ramsey policies with incom-
plete markets. Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppala (2002) and Farhi (2006) show that the
limiting behavior of optimal allocations depend on the nature of the limits imposed on the
governments assets and debt. The government is said to be subject to natural asset and
debt limits if these bounds merely insure that obligations will be paid back almost surely. More
stringent debt or asset limits are referred to as ad hoc.
Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppala (2002) show that with quasi-linear preferences,
Ramsey policies converge almost surely to the rst best if the Markov process for the aggregate
shock is ergodic under the natural debt and asset limits. If instead this process exhibits an
absorbing state, the optimal policies converge to a Ramsey equilibrium with complete markets
that depends on the values of endogenous state variables at the time the economy hits the
absorbing state. By contrast, under an ad hoc asset limit, the economy does not converge to
the rst best or to a Ramsey equilibrium with complete markets. It may not converge at all.
Farhi (2006) extends these results to an economy with capital and shows that under the
natural debt and asset limits the Ramsey equilibrium converges and the capital tax rate is zero
in the limiting distribution. Farhi (2006) also analyzes the properties of optimal policies for
general risk-averse preferences. He shows numerically that under the natural debt and asset
limits the capital income tax uctuates around zero. Under an ad hoc asset limit, the optimal
capital taxes are not zero.
We can interpret these ndings in terms of Theorem 15. Under the natural debt and asset
limits, Condition 14 holds. The rst best allocation satises the natural debt and asset limits
by construction. In addition, the implementability constraint (8) allows the government to
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save enough to be able to nance expenditures from asset returns and thus not apply any
distortionary taxes. Hence, there exists and admissible allocation that converges to the rst
best. By contrast, under an ad hoc asset limit on the government, there may not be an
admissible allocation that attains the rst best.
It turns out this reasoning can be extended to second best problems in economies with
idiosyncratic shocks and borrowing constraints, such as Aiyagari (1995). In these economies it
is usually assumed that the government cannot employ agent-specic transfers. This implies
that the rst best is never attainable as it is not possible to insure agents against the idiosyn-
cratic shocks. Section 6 presents a weaker version of our su¢ cient condition, namely, that the
rst best level of aggregate capital is attainable, and shows how it implies that there are no
permanent intertemporal distortions even if agent-specic transfers are not available.
5.2 Benevolent Governments and Limited Commitment
We now consider the general class of policy problems with limited commitment constraints
and a benevolent government. An implication of our result is that the absence of permanent
intertemporal distortions is a robust feature of this class of environments.




  O  x; kt  st 1 ; st ;
where O () is the value of the outside option, which can depend on allocations and the current








. The outside option is given by a particular allocation plan.
For example, in sustainable equilibria the outside option consists of a benecial temporary
deviation followed by reversion to the worst sustainable equilibrium.













 U  x; st ;





 O  x; kt  st 1 ; st ;
as long as the specication of the outside option respects feasibility constraints. Thus, Condi-
tion 14 is satised.17
Our result can be applied to any consistent specication of the limited commitment con-
straint. Thus, we can conclude that limited commitment constraints alone cannot provide a
rationale for permanent intertemporal distortions.
This result is related to Ray (2002), who studies the time structure of self-enforcing agree-
ments in a principal-agent framework. He shows that the optimal structure of incentives
involves backloading of payments to the agent since increasing future transfers improves in-
centives in the current as well as in future periods. A continuation rst best allocation by
17For our result to apply, we also need to rule out non-convexities in O () that would render the set of
admissible values of capital disconnected.
21
construction backloads transfers to the agent. Ray (2002) does not include capital or any
additional state variables and admissibility constraints in the analysis.
The contribution of our result for limited commitment models lies in its generality. It
applies with a benevolent government and with political economy frictions as we discuss in
Section 6. More importantly, it does not depend on the details of the game being played by
the society and the government. These details a¤ect the value of the outside option and, as is
well known, the properties of optimal allocations can be very sensitive to the choice of outside
option. Since the outside option is o¤ the equilibrium path, it is hard to discriminate between
the many possible specications. By contrast, the application of Theorem 15 makes clear that
the lack of permanent intertemporal distortions is a robust property for the class of limited
commitment models as a whole.
Limited commitment models can give rise to a permanent intertemporal wedge if additional
admissibility constraints are present. Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001)
study sustainable equilibria in an economy where the government sets all taxes every period
to satisfy a balanced-budget constraint. The limited commitment is, by itself, not enough to
rule out the continuation rst best: if the government had enough savings to pay for public
expenditure, there would be no gain from resetting taxes. It is instead the governments
inability to save that renders any continuation rst best allocation unattainable.18 Hence,
when front-loading of distortions is ruled out by other frictions, sustainable equilibria can
display permanent intertemporal distortions.
5.3 A Private Information Economy




t (u (ct)  v (lt)) ;
and T  1: Each agent produces output according to the technology:
yt = tlt;
where t denotes idiosyncratic labor productivity at time t; where t 2 : Assume for sim-
plicity that  is i.i.d. across agents. Each agent will be characterized by their realization of






















is measurable only with respect to t for t  0:
It is immediate to derive the rst best allocation, which maximizes the agentsex ante life-










; for all T ; ~
T
and for all t  0;
18 It turns out that the balanced-budget constraint, by itself, usually does not lead to positive capital taxes. In
Section 6 we discuss the balanced-budget constraint economy in the context of a weaker version of our su¢ cient
condition 14.
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 = t; for all T ; ~T and for all t  0:
This implies that labor supply is increasing in productivity:




for t > ~t:
We now relax the assumption that idiosyncratic labor productivities are observed by the
government. In particular, we assume that t and lt are private information and yt is observable,




















is measurable only with respect to t for t  0:
The optimal allocation can be obtained as a solution to a mechanism design problem. The
agents make reports on their type to the government and are assigned a consumption and labor
allocation based on these reports. The informational friction implies an additional constraint






the lifetime utility for an agent who reports her type to be ~
T
when




  U0 T ; ~T ; (21)
where T is an agents true type while ~
T 2 T is an agents reported type.
Clearly, the rst best is not incentive compatible and so Condition 14 does not hold. It
can be shown that the second best allocation displays the following three properties19. First,
there is limited insurance and individual consumption is increasing in productivity. Second,
there is a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor
and productivity for all agents except for the highest type. At the second best allocation, low
productivity workers work too much relative to the rst best, to make it unattractive for high







  RtEtu0  ct+1  t+1 ; (22)
where Rt is the rst best social discount factor20. The inequality is strict when agents are risk
averse and face idiosyncratic risk in the subsequent periods as shown in Golosov, Kocherlakota
and Tsyvinski (2003), that is when limited insurance is costly in utility terms for the agents.
This intertemporal wedge reects the presence of a social cost of increasing an agents
expected utility in future periods in addition to the private cost, reected in the marginal utility
of current consumption. This cost stems from the adverse incentive e¤ects of wealth. Higher
wealth reduces the sensitivity of consumption to current labor supply, which tightens future
incentive compatibility constraints. Another way to understand this intertemporal distortion
19See Albanesi and Sleet (2006).
20 In an economy with capital, Rt equals the marginal product of capital.
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is to contemplate the governments trade-o¤ in the allocation of consumption between two
consecutive periods. Consumption allocated to the future period will be worth less in terms
of utility, since it must be spread across di¤erent states to preserve incentives and agents are
risk averse. This induces the government to allocate consumption to the current period.
The intertemporal wedge implies that agents display a downward trend in consumption
and utility over their lifetime. Hence, consumption and utility are front loaded. By contrast, in
economies where our su¢ cient condition holds, distortions are front loaded so that consumption
and utility are back loaded. The optimal front loading of consumption and utility under private
information implies that their distribution spreads out over time. If T !1; the fanning out of
continuation utilities over time implies that there is no stationary distribution of consumption
and utility in the limit. In particular, the degree of consumption inequality tends to continually
increase, with all individuals in the population converging to their minimum promised lifetime
utility, except for a vanishing fraction converging to their bliss point, a property known as
immiseration.21
The fanning out of continuation utilities and the resulting lack of convergence stem from
the need to intertemporally smooth distortions, a need that arises only when agents are risk
averse and they face residual idiosyncratic risk. Under these conditions the intratemporal
distortions, that is limited insurance and the labor wedge, cannot be removed but they can be
ameliorated by front loading consumption and utility. Hence, the lack of stationarity of the
optimal allocation in the second best is intrinsically linked to the impossibility of eventually
eliminating all distortions, that is, the fact that the rst best can never be attained.
By contrast, if agents are subject to a one time productivity shock at the beginning of
their life, as in Werning (2006), there are no permanent intertemporal distortions. Similarly,
if the process for idiosyncratic shocks has an absorbing state which is reached with positive
probability, intertemporal distortions will be temporary.
6 A Weaker Su¢ cient Condition
A number of interesting second best problems fail to satisfy Condition 14 yet do not dis-
play permanent intertemporal distortions. Three notable examples include Aiyagaris (1995)
optimal scal policy problem with idiosyncratic shocks and borrowing constraints; the class
of political economy models with a self-interested ruler analyzed by Acemoglu, Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2007); and the standard Ramsey model under a balanced-budget constraint.
We provide a heuristic argument for the existence of a weaker su¢ cient condition for
the absence of permanent intertemporal distortions. The weaker condition is valid only in a
subset of second best problems in which the path of aggregate capital is not constrained by
its distribution among private agents. In this case, the existence an admissible allocation that
attains the rst best level of aggregate capital is su¢ cient to rule out permanent intertemporal
distortions. This is a clearly weaker condition than Condition 14. For example, in economies
with heterogeneous agents the admissibility constraints can rule out complete insurance, so
21The immizeration property is robust. It obtains in partial (Green, 1987, and Thomas and Worrall, 1990)
and general (Atkeson and Lucas, 1992) equilibrium, under weak assumptions on preferences (Phelan, 1998).
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the rst best allocation of individual consumption and labor cannot be attained. Yet, the rst
best level of capital may be admissible in the long run.
The argument is quite simple. If the choice of aggregate capital is independent from the
evolution of the capital distribution, the second best problem can be divided into two stages.
In the rst stage, aggregate variables are taken as given and individual allocations are chosen.
The optimal plan for aggregate variables is then determined in the rst stage. The set of
constraints on each stage must be specied to ensure that the resulting solution is feasible
and satises all the admissibility constraints in the original problem. The logic of our main
argument can be then applied to the second stage problem: if there is a path for aggregate
capital leading to its rst best, it must possible to front-load distortions at the aggregate level
and permanent intertemporal distortions will never be optimal.
This establishes that there are no aggregate intertemporal distortions. What about in-
dividual intertemporal distortions? It turns out that a stationary allocation the absence of
aggregate intertemporal distortions imply there cannot be permanent individual intertemporal
distortions. To see this, assume that for a subset of agents with positive measure
P1





for an arbitrary  > 0. Since there are no aggregate distortions we have F k (K; L) = 1. The
marginal utility of consumption for agent i is then a sub martingale and thus it is unbounded.
Agent i consumption necessarily converges to 0 and violates either feasibility or stationarity.
A similar reasoning can be applied to the case of a negative individual intertemporal wedge.22
The limitation of this result is that it can only be applied to a subset of the class of
economies that we are interested in. In particular, it excludes private information economies,
where in general the evolution of individual histories does constrain the dynamic choice of
aggregates. This property of the second best problem generally leads to permanent aggregate
and individual intertemporal distortions. If a stationary limiting distribution exists, these
distortions imply that the limiting path of aggregate capital is di¤erent from the rst best. In
economies without capital, they manifest themselves in an e¤ective value of the social discount
factor is di¤erent from the rst best value of .23
We now discuss three examples to illustrate the argument.
6.1 Example 1: Aiyagari (1995)
The rst example is given by Aiyagaris (1995) analysis of optimal scal policy in an incomplete
markets economy with heterogeneous agents. The government can impose linear tax rates on
labor and capital as well as issue risk-free debt. Individuals experience idiosyncratic shocks
22For some second best problems, the solution can feature stationary aggregate variables but the individual
variables may not be stationary. In this case it is only possible to prove that there are no permanent aggregate
intertemporal distortions.
23Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006) analyze second best allocations in private informa-
tion economies with idiosyncratic taste and ability shocks, respectively. A lower bound on continuation utilities
implies that there exists a stationary limiting distribution. In both cases, the social discount factor is smaller
than :
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to their productivity. They can save and partially insure themselves by holding capital and
government debt but their net worth must remain non-negative. There are no aggregate shocks.
The state can be summarized by aggregate capital and the distribution of net worth for this
economy. The distribution of capital among agents is not pinned down in equilibrium, since
agents are indi¤erent between holding capital or government debt. Hence, this environment
belongs to the subset of our class of second best problems in which the evolution of aggregate
capital can be decoupled from its distribution.
The rst best is never attainable in this economy as the government lacks the agent-specic
transfers needed to provide insurance agents idiosyncratic shocks. However, the government
can always nance its spending exclusively from labor taxes or returns from its assets, leaving
the level of capital undistorted. Hence, the weaker su¢ cient condition is satised.
Aiyagari (1995) shows that in the second best there is no permanent aggregate intertem-
poral wedge:
1 = F k (K; L) :
To implement this outcome it is necessary to levy a positive tax on capital. The tax counter-
acts the precautionary demand for capital arising from the constraint on borrowing. Despite
the presence of this tax, the individual intertemporal margin does not exhibit permanent dis-
tortions. The mass of agents with binding net worth constraint faces a negative intertemporal
wedge, while all other agents face a positive intertemporal wedge, corresponding to the optimal
capital tax. This discussion also claries that a positive capital tax would not be needed to
implement the second best allocation absent the constraint on net worth, even with incomplete
markets. In this case, all individual intertemporal wedges would equal zero in the limit.
The governments ability to accumulate debt or assets serves a dual purpose in this economy.
As in our general formulation, it allows for intratemporal distortions to be reallocated over
time. In addition, it decouples individual histories from individual capital holdings. It is this
property of the equilibrium that ensures the weaker su¢ cient condition holds.
6.2 Example 2: Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2007)
Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) (AGT henceforth) analyze a dynamic economy where
allocations are chosen by a self-interested ruler. The rulers utility function is dened over
sequences of transfers extorted from private agents: An allocation consists of sequences of
aggregate capital and transfers to the ruler as well as sequences of consumption and labor
supply decisions for each private agent. The ruler cannot observe individual abilities and can
seize a fraction of aggregate output. This leads to two sets of admissibility constraints in
each period. The sustainability constraint ensures that the ruler will not seize output, while
individual incentive compatibility constraints guarantee that private agents will not misreport
their type.
Under the assumption that the ruler is weakly more patient than private agents, this
model falls squarely in our framework.24 AGT show that in this case there are no permanent
24The case in which the ruler is less patient than private agents generally does not converge to an interior
stationary distribution and thus violates our regularity conditions.
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intertemporal distortions under the additional assumption that individual histories are private.
Yet, the incentive compatibility constraints on private agents imply that the rst best is never
attainable.
AGT prove this result by splitting the second best problem into two stages. The rst stage
corresponds to the choice of individual allocations subject to incentive compatibility constraints
for given aggregate sequences of consumption and labor supply. The second stage consists in the
provision of incentives to the ruler. That is, aggregate consumption, labor, capital and transfers
to the ruler are chosen subject to the resource constraint, the sustainability constraint and an
additional constraint that guarantees the existence of a solution to the rst stage problem.
This strategy parallels our previous discussion.
The key property of the model that guarantees this result is that the choice of individual
allocations does not permanently constrain the path of aggregate variables. The second stage
problem then resembles a representative agent model with a limited commitment constraint.
Hence, based on our result there will be no aggregate permanent intertemporal distortions if
there is a path for capital that converges to the rst best level for that problem.25 Since the
rulers continuation utility is weakly increasing in aggregate capital, based on our discussion
in Section 5.2, the rst best level of capital satises the limited commitment constraint. Some
mild assumptions on the rulers utility function guarantee that it is feasible to provide the
necessary transfers in every period and maintain capital at its rst best level.26
The assumption that individual histories of consumption, labor supply and ability are
private information is key for this result. In this case, agents face a sequence of static incentive
compatibility constraints. This restriction implies that individual allocations are not history
dependent. In this case, there are no individual intertemporal distortions, though there will
be permanent intratemporal distortions. In the case of public histories, the path of individual
histories constrains the dynamic of aggregate capital, as discussed in Section 5.3, leading to
both aggregate and individual intertemporal distortions.
6.3 Example 3: Balanced-Budget Constraint
Our last example examines the implications of a balanced-budget constraint on the government.
In an otherwise standard Ramsey model, the government is forced to nance its expenditure
solely from current tax revenues, that is, it cannot save or borrow. Both Judd (1985) and
Chamley (1986) claim that the absence of permanent intertemporal distortions does not depend
on assumptions about the governments ability to borrow or lend.27
This public policy problem has been analyzed for economies where the distribution of
capital is trivial, either because there is a single representative agent or it is a version of the
two-class economy of Judd (1985) where only one agent-type holds all the capital. There is
thus no distinction between individual and aggregate capital in these economies.
25 If Condition 14 holds for the stage two problem, then the weak su¢ cient condition holds for the overall
second best problem.
26See Assumption 4 in AGT (2007).
27See also Stockman (2001) for a detailed analysis.
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The rst best is generally not attainable under a balanced budget constraint. However, it
may be possible to nance government expenditures only through labor taxes. In this case the
rst best level of capital can be attained and our weaker su¢ cient condition applies.
This result may be surprising in light of the crucial role of the ability to front-load distor-
tions for our result. How can the government reallocate taxes across periods without being able
to save or borrow? It turns out that the government usually can independently manipulate
the path of consumption and capital even if it has no access to debt. It is actually helpful to
consider an economy where it cannot. Lansing (1999) shows that a zero capital tax cannot be
implemented in a two-class economy with logarithmic preferences and a balanced-budget con-
straint. The key observation is that the present value of future consumption only depends on
current consumption under logarithmic preferences. As a result the government cannot induce
a change in the intertemporal prole of consumption and an allocation with no permanent
intertemporal distortions cannot generically be implemented in equilibrium.28
7 Conclusions
Our result claries that the ability to reallocate distortions over time plays a key role for the
presence of permanent intertemporal distortions in the second best. A natural question is to
what extent the logic of the argument can be applied to environments outside our framework.
Of particular interest are second best problems in monetary economies. Many of these
models do not admit a primal representation and therefore do not t in our framework29.
However, in many cases the dynamics of capital are not constrained by the monetary frictions.
Following the reasoning in Section 6, we conjecture that as long as it is possible to attain the
rst best level of capital, there should be no permanent distortions in the investment decision.
Our argument requires restrictions on the degree of history dependence in the admissibility
constraints. In policy problems with an arbitrary degree of history dependence our result
does not hold. One trivial example is a Ramsey model where the capital tax rate must be
constant at all dates. In other settings, the unlimited history-dependence of the constraints
may be a primitive feature of the problem. Our condition on the limits of history dependence
is quite general, but it does not identify a general class of second best environments that are
not admitted in the formulation.
Our analysis presumes the existence of a second best plan that converges to a limiting
stationary allocation. Interestingly, in many economies the second best allocation does not
converge when it features permanent intertemporal distortions. Private information economies
28We have already briey mentioned another example where the balanced-budget constraint leads to positive
capital taxes: when it is combined with a limited commitment constraint. Note in this case the rst best level
of capital may not be admissible, as there is always the temptation to unexpectedly raise taxes.
29 In general, monetary models with nominal rigidities may exhibit unlimited history dependence in the ad-
missibility constraints violating our formulation. Moreover, money may enter the problem as an additional state
variable. Siu (2004) provides a primal representation for a monetary Ramsey model with sticky prices that can
be mapped in our framework.
Second best conomies where money is essential also do not admit a conventional primal representation. See
Aruoba and Chugh (2007) for an example.
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are a notable example. It is well-known that imposing a lower bound on continuation utility,
as in Atkeson and Lucas (1995), or allowing the government to discount the future at a lower
rate than private agents30, as in Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2006), guarantees the
existence of a non-degenerate limiting distribution. Yet, in both cases permanent intertemporal
distortions are a feature of the limiting optimal allocation. Hence, the presence of intertemporal
distortions does not depend on the convergence properties of the second best.
Finally, we restrict our attention to innite-horizon economies. Erosa and Gervais (2002),
Garriga (2003), and Krueger, Conesa, and Kitao (2006) show that it may be optimal to tax
capital in overlapping generations economies if age-specic taxes are not available. One fun-
damental di¤erence between innitely lived and overlapping generations economies is that the
latter can often display dynamic ine¢ ciencies. Importantly, with overlapping generations it is
not possible to shift distortions across time without an implicit transfer between generations.
A reconciliation of the ndings on intertemporal distortions for overlapping generations and
innite-horizon economies would obviously be of interest. We leave this topic for future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Limiting Probability Distributions
Formally, we dene a probability measure for any given allocation x as































 2 B, zero otherwise. The denition can be trivially extended to k and a. The



















A stationary distribution P1x for plan x is a probability distribution over measurable








for all measurable subsets B  X.

















where P1x 2 P1x , i.e., P1x a stationary distribution. Then, Condition 12 is equivalent to




x 2 Z  st = 1:
Finally, we dene the support Kfb for the limiting distribution for rst best allocations as







 2 Kfb = 1;
where kfb is part of a rst best plan.
A.2 Proofs in Section 4.1










for P1 2 P1x . There exists then a node st

such that for all st 2 Stjst ,   st = 0 with prob-
ability one. Without loss of generality, we look at allocations along the stationary distribution





impact on admissibility constraints (3) for nodes sj  st . The necessary rst order condition


































































































































































































































the constant vector .
Let  2  = K  S <m denote the complete state of the economy. Let







hci1 (x () ; )
hci2 (x () ; )
:::
hcin (x () ; )
37775
for some i 2 I. There is no need for a time subscript now. Our regularity Condition 8 implies
that 
ci () is continuous and bounded above and below.




s0 !i (; s
0) 
 (0; s0)P









s0jsuci  0F ki  0




. Since !i (; s0) > 0,  maps B unto itself.
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Because 
i () is bounded above and below, either 
i () equals a constant 
i with prob-
ability 1 in the stationary distribution P1, or
P1 ( [
i] () > 
i ()) > 0;
P1 ( [
i] () < 
i ()) > 0:
Otherwise if, say, P1 ( [
i] () > 
i ()) = 1, either the upper bound is violated with prob-
ability 1 or P1 (
i () = sup f
i ()g) = 1
The result on 
i maps into the Proposition after using the necessary rst order conditions
derived above




  at  st so the rst point follows.
For the second point, let feasible allocation fx; kg be such that U (x; s0) = W (a) and
U (x; s0) = W (a+ ") for " strictly positive. No admissibility constraint holds with equality
under a + " for allocation plan fx; kg, so the necessary rst order conditions must hold with










subject to the resource constraint (1) and non-negativity conditions. Given Condition 8, the
necessary rst order conditions are su¢ cient as well and, quite trivially, coincide with the
necessary rst order conditions for Problem 2 when no admissibility constraint is binding.
Thus x = xfb.
A.3 Proofs in Section 4.2












and ~a satisfy that ~a  a kt  st 1 ; st in Sj jst; j  t	, ~a = a elsewhere. Such ~a exists and
satises (4) for all sj 2 Sj jst, j  t by at
 
st
 2 Afb kt  st 1 ; st. To show that f~a; k; xg













































  ~amj  sj :
If there is any admissibility constraint binding in

Sj jst; j  t	, it can be then relaxed by
picking ~a over a, but W (~a) > W (a) would contradict fx; kg being a second best plan
Proof of Proposition 23. If at
 
st

















z 2 A : pz  pat
 
st









is a convex set by Condition 7.
Next we show that for any such a half-space, Afb\p 6= ?. Assume there exists p such that
Afb \ p = ?. Since the set Afb is attainable by Condition 14, there must exist some x 2 p
with y 2   (x; st), y 62 p for some state st 2 S (otherwise there would be no way to escape




= z+(1  )x. Such
a point will belong to the closure of the complement of p, i.e.,














y + (1  ) z 62 p a contradiction.






+ (1  ) a  st+1 :  2 [0; 1); a  st+1 2 Afb	. This is a
convex set with Afb  G. If    at  st ; st \ G = ?, it would be possible then to nd a







  p and G\p 6= ?. But this would contradict
Afb \ p 6= ?
Before proving Proposition 24 we nd useful to state a further property of the second best
plan for the auxiliary variable, which allows to order at least one element of Afb with respect
the dimensions of the auxiliary variable that correspond to binding admissibility constraints.
Proposition 25 Let some admissibility constraint m be binding at node st. Then there exists









Proof. Set Afb is non-empty by Condition 14. If at
 
st
 2 Afb then Proposition 22 says no
admissibility can be binding. Hence at
 
st




  at  st, at  st 6= at  st, then the denition of Afb is not satised. Finally,






a0nt : a0t 2 Afb
	
, then Condition 11 implies admissibility
constraint n cannot be binding
Proof of Proposition 24. If no admissibility constraint is binding, then xfb = x and the
















 2    at  st ; st+1.
The rest of the proof is structured with two Lemmas.
The following lemma says an auxiliary plan a can be improved if it is originally in the
interior of the image of the correspondence  .
Lemma 26 Let a be an admissible plan with at
 
st
 2 int     at 1  st 1 ; st :Then there
exists an admissible plan ~a with ~a  a, ~a 6= a.
Proof. We prove the Lemma by construction. Set ~a = a everywhere but in the set










< z and a
 
st+j






= z + (1  ) at
 
st
 2    at 1  st 1 ; st 1 :
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= z + (1  ) at+1
 
st+1
 2    ~a  st ; st
and so on st+j 2 St+j jst, j  1
Since Proposition 19 establishes that, if a0  a, then W (a0)  W (a), we can use Lemma
26 to conclude that, without loss of generality, if a is a second best plan, any admissible plan
a  a is also a second best plan. We say without loss of generalitybecause it must be that
W (a) =W (a), otherwise we would contradict a being a second best plan.
We extend the previous Lemma to any pair of ordered points in A.
Lemma 27 Let an admissible plan a and ~at
 
st









. Then there exists an admissible plan ~a  a, ~a 6= a.

































 2 int     at 1  st 1 ; st 1, and we can use Lemma 26









without loss of generality. Since this is true for any sequence with at
 
st








 2 Afb, it follows that one can take the sequence to converge almost surely
to Afb
A.4 Proof of Theorem 15
Proof. Let fx; kg be a second best allocation plan. By Proposition 24 and Condition 14,







 2 Afb = 1:












Note that for all second best plans fx; k; a0g the Lagrangian multipliers must be zero in the
same nodes, otherwise W (a0) 6=W (a) and either a0 or a would not constitute a second best
plan.
The Theorem is then proven by Proposition 18
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